



**Raytheon**  
Technologies

## **NDIA Systems & Mission Engineering Conference 2021**

### ***Cyber Supply Chain Risk Management (SCRM) Engineer, a Security Specialty within System Security Engineering***

Abstract #23774

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Raytheon Missiles & Defense, System Security Engineering

Cyber SCRM Engineering SME

December 2021

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# Agenda

- What is Cyber SCRM?
- Adversary
- Global Supply Chain Risks
- Customer Requirements
- Standards
- Future State Vision
- Integrating Cyber SCRM into RTX – It's a journey.
- Raytheon Cyber SCRM Role & Responsibility
- Customer Program Perspective Example
- Key Takeaways


# Key Definitions

- **Supply Chain Risk.** The risk that an adversary may sabotage, maliciously introduce unwanted function, or otherwise subvert the design, integrity, manufacturing, production, distribution, installation, operation, or maintenance of a system so as to surveil, deny, disrupt, or otherwise degrade the function, use, or operation of such system.
  - DoDI 5200.44, Protection of Mission Critical Functions to Achieve Trusted Systems and Networks (TSN)
- **Cyber Supply Chain Risk Management (C-SCRM)** is the process of identifying, assessing, and mitigating the risks associated with the distributed and interconnected nature of ICT product and service supply chains. It covers the entire lifecycle of a system (including design, development, distribution, deployment, acquisition, maintenance, and destruction) as supply chain threats and vulnerabilities may intentionally or unintentionally compromise an ICT product or service at any stage of the lifecycle. Department Homeland Security (DHS)
- **Cyber Supply Chain Risk Management (C-SCRM)** is a systematic process for managing cyber supply chain risk exposures, threats, and vulnerabilities throughout the supply chain and developing response strategies to the cyber supply chain risks presented by the supplier, the supplied products and services, or the supply chain.
  - DRAFT NIST 800-161 Rev 1, Cyber Supply Chain Risk Management Practices for Systems and Organizations



# The Threat is Real...

**The Adversary has moved from attacking our systems directly to attacking our supply chain.**




ALARM



TOMAHAWK



Battlefield Losses: Yugoslav Museum of Aviation




U.S. E-3C



**These are *Not* Cooperative R&D Efforts**

# Cyber Supply Chain Risk Management

The Global Supply Chain presents the greatest attack surface to our national security systems.



*Microelectronics is DOD's new No. 1 technology priority, bumping hypersonics to No. 3 – Inside Defense June 29, 2020*




We are responsible for ensuring the authenticity & integrity of the components integrated into our systems.





# Key Protection Activities to Improve Cyber Resiliency

Cyber SCRM Requirements are derived from DoDI 5200.44



Cyber Resilient & Secure Weapon Systems Summit, McLean, VA April 18, 2017  
Engineering Cyber Resilient Weapon Systems, Melinda Reed, DAsD(SE)


Policies, guidance and white papers are found at our initiatives site: [http://www.acq.osd.mil/se/initiatives/init\\_pp-sse.html](http://www.acq.osd.mil/se/initiatives/init_pp-sse.html)

# Relationship of DoD Acquisition Policies and Industry Best Practices often referred to as Standards

Program Protection & Cybersecurity DoDI 5000.02, Enclosure 3 & 14		
DoDM 5200.01, Vol. 1-4 DoDI 5200.39	DoDM 5200.45 DoDI 5200.44	DoDI 8500.01 DoDI 8510.01
Technology	Components	Information
<p><b>What:</b> A capability element that contributes to the warfighters' technical advantage (CPI)</p> <p><b>Key Protection Activity:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Anti-Tamper</li> <li>• Defense Exportability Features</li> <li>• CPI Protection List</li> <li>• Acquisition Security Database</li> </ul> <p><b>Goal:</b> Prevent the compromise and loss of CPI</p>	<p><b>What:</b> Mission-critical functions and components</p> <p><b>Key Protection Activity:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Software Assurance</li> <li>• Hardware Assurance/Trusted Foundry</li> <li>• Supply Chain Risk Management</li> <li>• Anti-counterfeits</li> <li>• Joint Federated Assurance Center (JFAC)</li> </ul> <p><b>Goal:</b> Protect key mission components from malicious activity</p>	<p><b>What:</b> Information about the program, system, designs, processes, capabilities and end-items</p> <p><b>Key Protection Activity:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Classification</li> <li>• Export Controls</li> <li>• Information Security</li> <li>• Joint Acquisition Protection &amp; Exploitation Cell (JAPEC)</li> </ul> <p><b>Goal:</b> Ensure key system and program data is protected from adversary collection</p>
<p><b>Protecting Warfighting Capability Throughout the Lifecycle</b></p> <p><small>Policies, guidance and white papers are found at our initiatives' site: <a href="http://www.acq.osd.mil/ise/initiatives/init_pp-ssr.html">http://www.acq.osd.mil/ise/initiatives/init_pp-ssr.html</a></small></p>		

Cyber Risk & Supply Chain Systems Issues: NSAS, 16 APR 15, 2011  
Engineering Cyber Network Mission System: Various Revs: (2002/04)


## Supply Chain Risk Management




# Raytheon Future State Cyber Supply Chain Risk Management

Mission Threat Analysis to Critical Component Identification & Categorization Enabler

Operational Systems of Systems



System Functional Decomposition




Architecting for Cyber Resiliency Guidance Document

Version 2 FDNAL  
27 September 2016

Prepared by:  
**Raytheon**

870 Winter Street  
Waltham, MA 02451-1449

Product of the Raytheon IDE Architecture Review Board



SwA Raytheon Vulnerability Assessment Process (Guide & Enabler)

Supply Chain Trade Space Options

Internal Test Capability Catalog & Guide


Capability 1,2,3,4,5....  
Applicable Type of Component  
Level of Risk Mitigation

Statistical Test Optimization

Internal Risk Mitigation Product Catalog

Critical Components Identification & Categorization (Hardware, Software, Firmware)

Filtering Assessments & Rating Management





# Catalog Trade Based Cyber SCRM Options



Programs need a **range of risk mitigations** to address supply chain risks for our System Mission Critical Components.

- Tiered Component Design Features
- Tiered Criteria and Audits for Levels of Security in Manufacturing
- Tiered Criteria and Evaluation of Suppliers
- Tiered Criteria for Critical Component Pedigree
- Tiered Requirements to Flow to Suppliers for How to Manage Data & Information
- Tiered Criteria and Options for Test Requirements and Evidence by the Type of Component
- Tiered Criteria and Options for Transportation & Logistics Mitigations.

## NOTIONAL

- Design
- Manufacturing
- Source (Suppliers)
- Traceability / Provenance Mapping
- Pedigree (Quality)
- Data & Information Management
- Testing
- Transportation & Logistics


## Levels of Risk Mitigation / Countermeasures



# Cyber Supply Chain Risk Management


## NIST SP 800-161

Supply Chain Risk Management Practices for Federal Information Systems & Organizations




<https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-161/final>

**Raytheon Program Protection**




# Raytheon's Integrated Supply Chain Construct



Integrate Cyber SCRM Considerations into Existing Raytheon Supply Chain Methods and Tools




# Raytheon's Cyber SCRM Role OV-1




The Cyber SCRM Engineering Lead is responsible for the program strategy and technical subsystem and component procurement and subcontracting requirements to address global supply chain risks.

- Cyber SCRM Strategy
- System Mission Criticality Analysis for Logic Bearing Critical Component Identification
- Bill of Materials Decomposition
- Mitigation Evaluation for Procured and Subcontracted Material and Software.
- Supplier / Sub Selection Criteria for Cyber SCRM Considerations
- Cyber SCRM Asset Management Considerations

## Engineering



## Supply Chain




## Enterprise Team



### Cyber SCRM Engineer Addresses Global Supply Chain Risks to Program Procurements

# Example Raytheon Program Cyber SCRM Perspective

Holly Dunlap



Raytheon's Cyber Supply Chain Risk Management Program Plan Relational Mapping

# Cyber Supply Chain Risk Management

## Key Takeaways

- Adversaries are moving from directly attacking our systems to attacking our more vulnerable supply chains.
- Cyber SCRM is a new and developing security specialty discipline within System Security Engineering and Systems Engineering
- A partnership between Engineering, Mission Assurance, and Supply Chain organizations is an imperative.
- Cyber SCRM contributes to a holistic approach to program protection and a Program Protection implementation Plan (PPiP).



## References:

- DoDI 5200.44
  - <https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodi/520044p.pdf?ver=2018-11-08-075800-903>
- NIST SP 800-53 Rev 5
  - <https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-53r5.pdf>
- NIST SP 800-160
  - <https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-160v1.pdf>
- NIST SP 800-161
  - <https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-161/rev-1/draft>
- Deliver Uncompromised, A Strategy for Supply Chain Security and Resilience in Response to the Changing Character of War
  - <https://www.mitre.org/sites/default/files/publications/pr-18-2417-deliver-uncompromised-MITRE-study-26AUG2019.pdf>

**Questions?**

# Holly Dunlap Bio

- BS Electrical Engineering & MBA
- 10 years Nuclear Weapons, National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Kansas City Plant, M&O Honeywell
  - 3 Year Rotational Leadership Development Program (10 years experience in 3 years)
    - Program Manager of B83
    - Supply Chain 18 months (Rotated every 3 months)
    - Intelligence Community (Reverse Engineering, Rapid Fielding, Analysis)
  - Certified 6 Sigma Black Belt – Microelectronics
- OSD DDR&E Technical Intelligence, Pentagon +4 years
  - Emerging & Disruptive Technology. Investment strategy to ensure US technical capability advantage. Work intimately with Anti-tamper Executive Agent, National & Defense Intelligence Community, and Defense System Developers. Strategic 15 – 20 Year Planning.
- Ktech Later Acquired by RTN RMS
  - USD(I) Contract Supply Chain & Logistics Layered Analysis; Data & Information Exploitation. 18 month effort.
- RMS – IDS – RMD (+15 years)
  - NDIA System Engineering Division Elected Chair (+13 Committees, +500 members; government, industry, academia, FFRDC)
  - NDIA System Security Engineering Committee Chair, +9 years
  - Raytheon Systems Engineering Council – Cyber Resiliency & System Security Project Lead
  - Cyber Enterprise Campaign
  - Cyber Operations Development & Evaluation (CODE) Center
  - PI Security & Trustworthy Foundations for Electronics Resurgence (STryFER) IDIQ Contracted Research & Development (CRAD) Proposal



# Thank you.